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Summary
This report updates the 2009 recommendations from the CDC Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) regarding 
use of anthrax vaccine in the United States (Wright JG, Quinn CP, Shadomy S, Messonnier N. Use of anthrax vaccine in the 
United States: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices [ACIP)], 2009. MMWR Recomm 
Rep 2010;59[No. RR-6]). The report 1) summarizes data on estimated efficacy in humans using a correlates of protection model 
and safety data published since the last ACIP review, 2) provides updated guidance for use of anthrax vaccine adsorbed (AVA) for 
preexposure prophylaxis (PrEP) and in conjunction with antimicrobials for postexposure prophylaxis (PEP), 3) provides updated 
guidance regarding PrEP vaccination of emergency and other responders, 4) summarizes the available data on an investigational 
anthrax vaccine (AV7909), and 5) discusses the use of anthrax antitoxins for PEP. 
Changes from previous guidance in this report include the following: 1) a booster dose of AVA for PrEP can be given every 
3 years instead of annually to persons not at high risk for exposure to Bacillus anthracis who have previously received the initial 
AVA 3-dose priming and 2-dose booster series and want to maintain protection; 2) during a large-scale emergency response, AVA 
for PEP can be administered using an intramuscular route if the subcutaneous route of administration poses significant materiel, 
personnel, or clinical challenges that might delay or preclude vaccination; 3) recommendations on dose-sparing AVA PEP regimens 
if the anthrax vaccine supply is insufficient to vaccinate all potentially exposed persons; and 4) clarification on the duration of 
antimicrobial therapy when used in conjunction with vaccine for PEP.
These updated recommendations can be used by health care providers and guide emergency preparedness officials and planners 
who are developing plans to provide anthrax vaccine, including preparations for a wide-area aerosol release of B. anthracis spores. 
The recommendations also provide guidance on dose-sparing options, if needed, to extend the supply of vaccine to increase the 
number of persons receiving PEP in a mass casualty event.
Introduction
Anthrax is an acute febrile illness caused by infection with 
Bacillus anthracis. The mortality rate, even with treatment, 
ranges from <2% for cutaneous anthrax (1) to 45% for 
inhalation anthrax (2) and 92% for anthrax meningitis (3). 
B. anthracis is a zoonotic pathogen that primarily infects sheep, 
goats, cattle, and other herbivores. Humans become infected 
after exposure to infected animals or contaminated animal 
products or, rarely, as a complication from injection drug use 
(4). B. anthracis is also a tier 1 select agent and is considered one 
of the bioterrorism agents that is most likely to be used because 
it is relatively easy to acquire from the natural environment, 
mass produce, and disseminate as spores via aerosolization (5).
Anthrax vaccine adsorbed (AVA) (BioThrax) is licensed for 
preexposure prophylaxis (PrEP) for adults aged 18–65 years 
at high risk for exposure to B. anthracis (6). The dosage 
approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
is 0.5 mL administered intramuscularly (IM) at 0, 1, and 
6 months with boosters at 6 and 12 months after completion 
of the primary series and at 12-month intervals thereafter. 
AVA also is licensed for postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) in 
combination with antimicrobials for adults aged 18–65 years 
with suspected or known exposure to aerosolized B. anthracis 
spores. The dosage approved by FDA is 0.5 mL administered 
subcutaneously (SC) at 0, 2, and 4 weeks. For persons not 
included in the FDA-approved indication for PEP, AVA 
will be available for PEP use for children, pregnant women, 
nursing mothers and older adults (i.e., ≥66 years) under 
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appropriate emergency use regulatory provisions. Although 
data are lacking on the immune impact of mixing the IM and 
SC routes of administration, as might occur when switching 
from PrEP to PEP, switching between routes would be 
unlikely to adversely impact immunity because both routes 
provide adequate immunity.
AV7909 (AVA plus CpG 7909 adjuvant) is a second-
generation anthrax vaccine produced by Emergent BioSolutions 
that is in a phase 3 trial (https://clinicaltrials.gov). The 
CpG 7909 adjuvant binds to the Toll-like receptor 9 to enhance 
the immune response to coadministered antigens (primarily 
B. anthracis protective antigen) (7,8). The PEP schedule, 
under clinical evaluation for AV7909, is 0.5 mL AVA with 
0.25 mg CpG 7909 adjuvant administered IM at 0 and 2 weeks 
postexposure, combined with antimicrobials.
Since the publication in 2010 of the Advisory Committee on 
Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommendations for use of 
anthrax vaccine in the United States (9), published studies have 
1) addressed the efficacy, immunogenicity, and reactogenicity 
of the recommended and alternate dose-sparing schedules of 
AVA; 2) estimated AVA efficacy in humans from data on animal 
efficacy and human antibody levels by using a correlates of 
protection model; and 3) evaluated whether developing chronic 
illnesses or having adverse pregnancy outcomes are associated 
with previous AVA receipt. In addition, AV7909 phase 1 and 2 
clinical trials have demonstrated the potential of AV7909 for 
use as the vaccine component of PEP (PEP-Vx) (10–12).
Given these newly available data, CDC asked ACIP to 
revise the recommendations for use of anthrax vaccines in 
the United States. These revised recommendations address 
the IM versus SC administration of AVA for PEP and the use 
of reduced-schedule and half-dose AVA during public health 
emergencies, shortening the duration of antimicrobials given 
in conjunction with PEP-Vx, and extending the AVA PrEP 
booster dose interval after the initial priming and booster 
series. This report provides recommendations and guidance 
regarding the use of AVA for PrEP and PEP and updates the 
ACIP anthrax vaccination recommendations published in 
2002 and 2010. This report also describes available data for 
AV7909 because of its potential for prelicensure emergency 
use during a large-scale anthrax public health emergency 
if the AVA supply is inadequate. This report can be used 
by health care providers to update the current practice for 
providing anthrax vaccine for PrEP and PEP and can be used 
by emergency preparedness partners to develop emergency 
vaccine response plans in preparation for a wide-area 
aerosolized release of B. anthracis spores.
Methods
During March 2017–January 2019, the ACIP Anthrax 
Vaccines Work Group (AVWG), which comprises professionals 
from academic medicine (internal medicine, pediatrics, 
obstetrics, and infectious disease specialists), federal and state 
public health entities, and medical societies, participated in 
monthly telephone conferences facilitated by CDC. During 
these meetings, AVWG reviewed relevant scientific evidence 
and evaluated the quality of the evidence assessing the 
1) immunogenicity and safety of an extended booster dose 
interval for PrEP in persons not at high risk for exposure 
to B. anthracis but who might have a future high risk for 
exposure; 2) benefits and harms of the IM versus SC route 
of administration for PEP-Vx; 3) benefits and harms of AVA 
dose-sparing schedules (i.e., 2 full doses or 3 half doses) for 
PEP-Vx if vaccination demands were to exceed vaccine supply 
after a wide-area aerosolized release of B. anthracis spores; 
4) immunogenicity and safety of AV7909, based on available 
data; and 5) use of anthrax antitoxin for PEP in conjunction 
with anthrax vaccine.
A scientific literature search was conducted through a 
systematic review for studies involving human subjects or for 
animal studies that met criteria for the Animal Rule (13,14) 
that reported primary data on important health outcomes 
related to AVA or AV7909 published after 2008. The previous 
ACIP review summarized the data through 2008 (9). Databases 
searched in February 2017 included Medline (OVID), Embase 
(OVID), CAB Abstracts (OVID), Global Health (OVID), 
CINAHL (Ebsco), Econlit (Ebsco), Cochrane Library, Clinical 
Trials.gov, FedRip (Ebsco), the U.S. Department of Defense 
(DoD) Technical Information Center, NTIS:NTRL, Scopus, 
WHOLIS, and WorldCat. Search terms included anthrax 
vaccine, AVA, Biothrax, Nuthrax, AV7909, CpG DNA, 
CpG 7909, CpG motifs, CpG oligodeoxynucleotide, Anthim, 
Anthrasil, obiltoxaximab, and raxibacumab. In addition, the 
work group reviewed unpublished data from the CDC Anthrax 
Vaccine Research Program, unpublished data from the vaccine 
manufacturer, and results of studies from the Vaccine Analytic 
Unit, which is a CDC-led collaboration with DoD and FDA 
that assessed potential associations of AVA with development 
of chronic conditions (15). The review of vaccine safety also 
included adverse events reported to the Vaccine Adverse Event 
Reporting System (VAERS) after AVA administration for 
January 1, 2009, through June 30, 2017 (16). To qualify as a 
candidate for inclusion in the review, a study had to present 
immunogenicity or safety data on AVA, AV7909, or infectious 
disease vaccines that used CpG 7909 adjuvant. Studies were 
excluded if they lacked mention of either AVA or AV7909 for 
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the prevention of anthrax, lacked primary data, or were outside 
the time frame of interest.
Data were abstracted and summarized for immunogenicity 
outcomes of interest, including seroconversion, geometric 
mean concentration (GMC) of anti-protective antigen 
immunoglobulin G (anti-PA IgG, determined by enzyme-
linked immunosorbent assay), geometric mean titer (GMT) of 
toxin neutralization activity (TNA), effective dose 50 (ED50) 
levels, and GMT of TNA neutralization factor 50 (NF50) 
levels. Data also were abstracted and summarized for safety 
outcomes of interest, including injection site adverse events, 
systemic adverse events, and serious adverse events. Quality of 
evidence was evaluated and presented in tabular format using 
the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development 
and Evaluation (GRADE) approach (17).
Evidence that had been summarized for and reviewed 
by AVWG was publicly presented at the ACIP meetings 
in June 2017, October 2017, February 2018, June 2018, 
October 2018, and February 2019 (18). After a public 
comment period, ACIP voting members at the June 2018 
and February 2019 meetings unanimously approved the 
proposed recommendations.
Risk for Exposure to Anthrax
The risk for exposure to aerosolized B. anthracis spores in 
the United States is very low (19). Anthrax is only endemic 
in a few sparsely populated areas in the western United States 
(20). Certain occupations and other activities place persons at 
higher risk for exposure (21). These include laboratory work 
that involves bioproduction of large quantities, volumes, or 
high concentrations of B. anthracis spores and activities with 
a high potential for exposure to aerosolized B. anthracis spores, 
such as military deployment to areas designated by DoD as 
posing a high risk for anthrax exposure and emergency response 
activities after release of B. anthracis spores (9).
The possibility exists of an intentional wide-area aerosolized 
release of B. anthracis spores over a densely populated area in the 
United States. In 2001, letters containing B. anthracis spores 
sent through the U.S. Postal Service led to 22 cases of anthrax, 
five of which were fatal (22). In addition, certain countries and 
terrorist groups have explored the use of anthrax as a bioweapon 
(23–25). An aerosolized release of B. anthracis spores over 
densely populated areas could become a mass-casualty incident 
(26). However, previously developed, publicly available 
clinical recommendations only addressed clinical management 
using conventional standards of care (27). To prepare for the 
possibility of an anthrax mass-casualty incident, when the 
number of patients is likely to exceed the ability of the health 
care infrastructure to provide conventional standards of care 
and supplies might not meet demand, the U.S. government 
has stockpiled equipment and therapeutics (i.e., medical 
countermeasures) for anthrax prevention and treatment 
and provided recommendations for their use (28). The U.S. 
government’s Strategic National Stockpile stores anthrax 
vaccine to be used with antimicrobials for PEP of persons with 
known or potential exposure to B. anthracis spores, as well 
as therapeutics and supplies for anthrax treatment. Animal 
models have shown that although 5–30 days of antimicrobials 
might be insufficient to prevent anthrax after single exposures 
or reexposures to B. anthracis spores, the addition of vaccine 
substantially enhances efficacy (29–31). In the event of a 
large-scale release of B. anthracis spores, the Strategic National 
Stockpile will distribute medical countermeasures to affected 
states, and state and local public health agencies will then 
dispense antimicrobials to and vaccinate numerous at-risk 
persons. Antimicrobials are given long enough (up to 60 days) 
to prevent infection until the vaccine can elicit a protective 
immune response (29).
Summary of Key Findings
Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed
Because human efficacy studies of inhalation anthrax are 
unethical, the effectiveness of AVA for PEP cannot be directly 
assessed in humans. For this situation, FDA allows the use 
of the Animal Rule, a set of regulations that allow approval 
of products critical for the protection of public health and 
national security based on efficacy data only in animals 
combined with immunogenicity and safety data in animals 
and humans (32). Under the Animal Rule, AVA vaccine-
induced antibody levels were extrapolated from vaccine efficacy 
studies conducted in animals to predict vaccine effectiveness 
in humans (33). Statistical modeling was used to establish 
the relation between survival of AVA-vaccinated animals 
challenged with B. anthracis spores and their antibody levels 
at the time of infectious challenge. This relation was applied 
to postvaccination antibody levels in humans to estimate the 
probability of human survival at selected time points (34).
Route of Administration and Immunogenicity of 
AVA for PEP
The SC route of administration of AVA is preferred in 
adults because SC administration results in higher antibody 
concentrations by week 4 than the IM route: males SC, 
40.8 µg/mL (95% confidence interval [CI]: 34.0–49.1); 
males IM, 26.3 µg/mL (95% CI: 21.9–31.2); females SC, 
60.2 µg/mL, (95% CI: 50.1–72.3), females IM, 36.0 µg/ml 
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(95% CI: 30.0–43.1 (35). Using these antibody concentrations, 
survival estimates based on the correlates of protection model 
are 3.8% higher for the SC route (92.4%) than the IM route 
(88.6%) of administration at week 4 (36). However, by week 9, 
the antibody concentrations and predicted survival from the 
IM route (95.6%) and SC route (96.1%) are no longer 
significantly different (35).
In a wide-area aerosolized release of B. anthracis spores over 
a densely populated area, potentially hundreds of thousands of 
exposed persons might require PEP-Vx to prevent inhalation 
anthrax. In such a situation, rapid and efficient administration 
of vaccine to large numbers of persons would be a key 
component of the public health emergency response. Health 
care providers typically have more experience administering 
vaccines by the IM route than the SC route. In addition, 
during a conference call with state and local jurisdictions, many 
public health officials indicated that they plan to use just-in-
time training for responding vaccinators during a wide-area 
aerosolized release of B. anthracis spores. Officials also stated 
during this call that training vaccinators to use the IM route 
was the easiest (State and local public health preparedness 
officials, personal communication, 2018). In addition, a study 
comparing the IM and SC route for AVA administration found 
significantly less reactogenicity (less injection site warmth, 
itching, erythema, induration, swelling, and nodule formation) 
with the IM route than with the SC route at 0, 2, and 4 weeks. 
In this same study, only two adverse events were more common 
among IM AVA recipients than SC AVA recipients: limitation 
of arm motion and generalized myalgia (35). Because the 
preponderance of injection site adverse events was associated 
with the SC route, concern has been raised that using this 
route might decrease the likelihood of patients completing the 
second and third doses of AVA.
Dose-Sparing Strategies for PEP-Vx
A wide-area aerosolized release of B. anthracis spores over 
a densely populated area could potentially require PEP-Vx 
of more persons than could be vaccinated with the available 
supply of AVA in the Strategic National Stockpile if AVA were 
to be administered according to the licensed regimen (0.5 mL 
at 0, 2, and 4 weeks) for the PEP-Vx indication. If demand 
were to exceed the supply, alternative AVA dose-sparing 
regimens might be needed to provide PEP-Vx to all persons 
with suspected or known exposure to aerosolized B. anthracis 
spores. To address this problem, studies were reviewed that 
estimated survival with AVA administered according to the 
licensed PEP-Vx schedule (3 full [0.5-ml] doses at 0, 2, and 
4 weeks) versus alternate dose-sparing schedules (i.e., 2 full 
doses at 0 and 2 weeks, 2 full doses at 0 and 4 weeks, and 
3 half [0.25-ml] doses at 0, 2, and 4 weeks) (Figure). The 
three groups who received an AVA dose at week 2 had higher 
antibody concentrations at week 4 than the one group who 
FIGURE. Group geometric means for anti-protective antigen immunoglobulin G enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay over time after 
administration of anthrax vaccine adsorbed*
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did not. The dose-sparing schedule of 2 full doses administered 
4 weeks apart produced the highest antibody concentrations 
from week 6 onward after the first dose. The 3 full-dose 
regimen produced higher antibody concentrations than when 
the vaccine was administered as 3 half doses at all measured 
time points after week 1. The peak response was measured 
2 weeks after the last dose for the licensed and dose-sparing 
PEP-Vx schedules and was estimated to be highly protective 
by the correlates of protection model (37). The predicted 
survival was estimated to be 97.4% (95% CI: 85.1–100) for the 
licensed schedule, 95.8% (95% CI: 92.2–100) for the full dose 
administered at 0 and 2 weeks, 98.1% (95% CI: 86.9–100) 
for the full dose administered at 0 and 4 weeks, and 96.1% 
(95% CI: 83.7–100) for the 3 half doses administered at 0, 2, 
and 4 weeks (Table 1). All dosing PEP-Vx schedules maintain 
a high level of predicted survival through week 9 (36,38).
Duration of Antimicrobial Administration in 
Combination with Vaccine
Since 2000, FDA has approved several oral antimicrobials 
(ciprofloxacin in 2000, penicillin G in 2001, doxycycline in 
2001, and levofloxacin in 2004) for antimicrobial postexposure 
prophylaxis (PEP-Abx) of anthrax. Each PEP-Abx regimen 
should be administered for 60 days when not used in 
combination with vaccine. However, studies of nonhuman 
primates have demonstrated that spores can persist in the 
lungs many days after inhalation exposure (up to 100 days 
in one animal study) and that anthrax can develop after 
discontinuation of PEP-Abx (29,30). Because of the possibility 
of delayed infection from persistent spores, recommendations 
for PEP require use of AVA in conjunction with antimicrobial 
drugs. With this strategy, the antimicrobials protect against 
germinating spores until the vaccine can elicit a protective 
immune response.
Using the limited data available at the time, in 2015, FDA 
licensed a 3-dose regimen of AVA to be given in conjunction 
with recommended antimicrobials for PEP for persons 
potentially exposed to aerosolized B. anthracis spores (39). 
Newer data from a human clinical trial with AVA demonstrate 
that, with concurrent receipt of AVA, the duration of 
antimicrobial use can be shortened from the recommended 
60 days (38). In the trial, persons were given one of four 
PEP-Vx regimens: the licensed 3-dose schedule, a dose-sparing 
schedule with 2 full doses at 0 and 2 weeks, a dose-sparing 
schedule with 2 full doses at 0 and 4 weeks, or a dose-sparing 
schedule with 3 half doses at 0, 2, and 4 weeks. Antibody 
levels predicted to be protective in humans were extrapolated 
from a matched nonhuman primate nonclinical trial in which 
48 nonhuman primates were given 2 doses of AVA at 0 and 
2 weeks and challenged with a 200 LD50 dose of B. anthracis 
spores at week 4. Protection provided by anti-PA IgG was 
modeled using logistic regression of the measured prechallenge 
antibody levels at week 4 in nonhuman primates versus survival 
of challenge (36). The nonhuman primate prediction curve 
was then applied to the human antibody levels to predict 
protection in humans (38). The estimated peak protection both 
for licensed and dose-sparing AVA PEP-Vx regimens occurred 
2 weeks after the last AVA dose was given. All regimens are 
estimated to be highly protective; protection is maintained 
through day 60, when the antimicrobial component of PEP 
is recommended to end (Table 1).
Safety
Since 2008, the vast majority of AVA vaccinations 
(approximately 8 million doses administered to approximately 
1.9 million persons) have been administered by DoD as PrEP 
to its service members. The PrEP route of administration 
was SC until FDA approved changing the PrEP route of 
administration to IM in December 2008. As defined by the 
TABLE 1. Anthrax vaccine adsorbed postexposure prophylaxis schedules and predicted human survival* 
Time from first dose 
of PEP-Vx
Predicted human survival by PEP-Vx schedule
Licensed vaccination regimen Alternate dose-sparing schedules
Full dose at 0, 2, and 4 wks Full dose† at 0 and 2 wks Full dose at 0 and 4 wks Half dose§ at 0, 2, and 4 wks
% (95% CI) % (95% CI) % (95% CI) % (95% CI)
Week 4 95.8 (92.2–100) 95.8 (82.6–100) 72.6¶ (58.2–92.9) 91.1 (78.2–98.7)
Week 6 97.4 (85.1–100) 95.5 (81.7–100) 98.1 (86.9–100) 96.1 (83.7–100)
Week 9 96.4 (83.1–100) 93.3 (78.9–100) 97.0 (84.4–100) 94.2 (80.8–100)
Source: Data from Stark GV, Sivko GS, VanRaden M, et al. Cross-species prediction of human survival probabilities for accelerated anthrax vaccine adsorbed (AVA) 
regimens and the potential for vaccine and antibiotic dose sparing. Vaccine 2016;34:6512–7.
Abbreviations: AVA = anthrax vaccine adsorbed; CI = confidence interval; PEP-Vx = AVA postexposure prophylaxis.
* Based on survival data from nonhuman primates that received AVA at weeks 0 and 2 and were challenged with a target dose of 200 LD50 aerosolized Bacillus anthracis 
spores at week 4.
† 0.5 mL of AVA.
§ 0.25 mL of AVA.
¶ At 4 weeks before the second dose of vaccine.
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U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, an event is classified as 
serious if one or more of the following conditions is reported: 
death, a life-threatening illness, hospitalization or prolongation 
of existing hospitalization, permanent disability, or a congenital 
anomaly or birth defect (40). From January 1, 2009, through 
June 30, 2017, a total of 2,439 AVA-related adverse events 
were reported to VAERS (16); 329 (13.5%) of these were 
considered serious. 
During the same period, the 10 most common reported 
adverse events were coded as headache (14.7%), injection 
site erythema (13.6%), pain (12.6%), fever (11.6%), fatigue 
(11.5%), arthralgia (11.2%), erythema (11.2%), injection site 
pain (9.9%), injection site swelling (9.8%), and rash (9.4%) 
on the basis of coding terms from the Medical Dictionary for 
Regulatory Activities. VAERS has numerous strengths, such as 
broad national scope and early detection of possible new, rare, 
or unusual patterns of adverse events. However, VAERS is a 
spontaneous reporting system that has important limitations, 
including underreporting, inconsistent data quality and report 
completeness, and lack of an unexposed comparison group. 
Therefore, the data generally cannot be used to assess whether 
a vaccine caused an adverse event (16).
Nine studies, including clinical vaccine trials and observational 
studies (10,12,35,37,41–45), also assessed serious adverse 
events after administration of AVA, AV7909, or both in 
human subjects. Serious adverse events were reported in three 
studies (12,35,43); however, only in the Anthrax Vaccine 
Review Program study (35) were the serious adverse events 
considered possibly related to AVA. In this study, 231 adverse 
events were identified in recipients of approximately 8,300 
doses of AVA. Six serious adverse events, none of which was 
fatal, were considered to be possibly related to the vaccine, 
including ductal carcinoma of the breast, generalized allergic 
reaction, new onset bilateral arthralgia of the metacarpal 
joints associated with positive antinuclear antibody (ANA), 
bilateral pseudotumor cerebri, supraspinatous tendon tear, and 
new onset of generalized seizures associated with aqueductal 
stenosis (35).
In studies from the Vaccine Analytic Unit and other groups 
published since 2010, no association was found between AVA 
receipt and the following chronic health conditions: reduction 
in health-related quality of life measures (46), multisystem 
illness (47), long-term disabilities (48,49), type 1 diabetes (50), 
atrial fibrillation (51), and diffuse connective tissue diseases 
(52). In one case-control study, an association was identified 
between AVA receipt and new-onset rheumatoid arthritis if a 
look-back period of 3 months was used (odds ratio [OR]: 3.93; 
95% CI: 1.08–14.27). However, no association between AVA 
and rheumatoid arthritis was identified if a longer look-back 
period of 3 years was used (OR: 1.03; 95% CI: 0.48–2.19) 
(52), suggesting that AVA exposure might trigger onset of 
rheumatoid arthritis in persons who would eventually have 
developed rheumatoid arthritis later in life.
Although AVA is not intended for use during pregnancy, 
DoD maintains a registry of women inadvertently vaccinated 
while pregnant. Studies of adverse outcomes and a cohort study 
of birth defects using this registry did not detect any increased 
rates of adverse fetal or infant outcomes among women who 
received AVA during their first trimester compared with receipt 
at other time points or no receipt of AVA (53,54). Finally, 
because no safety data are available for AVA use in adolescents, a 
presidential ethics commission proposed comparing AVA safety 
data for the group aged 18–20 years (the youngest group) and 
the group aged 21–29 years. If no significant safety difference 
could be found between the two age groups, then evaluations 
could proceed in successively younger adolescents. In a study 
following these suggested methods, AVA was deemed safe 
in adults aged 18–20 years (44); no additional studies have 
been conducted in younger age groups. AVWG reviewed the 
VAERS reports and the published literature and presented 
their findings to the ACIP committee. On the basis of these 
data, the committee concluded that no clinically significant 
safety concerns have been identified related to receipt of AVA 
since 2010 (9).
AV7909
AV7909 is an investigational second-generation anthrax 
vaccine that is under development for PEP of inhalation 
anthrax in conjunction with appropriate antimicrobials. 
AV7909 consists of the licensed AVA combined with a 
novel adjuvant, CpG 7909, a synthetic immunostimulatory 
oligodeoxynucleotide. CpG 7909 is a Toll-like receptor 9 
agonist that has been demonstrated to augment Th1 responses 
in humans and enhance innate and adaptive immunity (7,8)
AV7909 is intended to be added to the Strategic National 
Stockpile. CDC has submitted a pre–Emergency Use 
Authorization (EUA) request to FDA to allow potential 
emergency use of AV7909, in conjunction with appropriate 
PEP-Abx, for PEP of inhalation anthrax when the supply of 
the currently licensed AVA is inadequate. EUA is an authority 
given to the FDA commissioner to legally permit the use of 
an unapproved medical product or unapproved use of an 
approved medical product (55). Under the proposed EUA, 
AV7909 would be administered by the IM route as a 2-dose 
series 2 weeks apart in conjunction with PEP-Abx for adults 
aged 18–65 years. Pregnant or nursing mothers, older adults 
(aged ≥66 years), and children (aged <18 years) should receive 
AVA until data to adequately support AV7909 use in these 
additional populations under EUA become available. 
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Available data indicate that AV7909 might provide the 
following advantages over AVA:
• Two IM doses of AV7909 administered 2 weeks apart 
might provide protective immunity 1–2 weeks sooner than 
the licensed 3-dose PEP-Vx regimen of AVA.
• Compared with the licensed 3-dose AVA PEP-Vx schedule, 
the 2-dose schedule of AV7909 PEP provides an operational 
advantage in a large-scale, mass vaccination response.
• Adherence might be better because more persons are likely 
to complete the 2-dose AV7909 PEP series than the 3-dose 
AVA PEP series.
Immunogenicity
The initial phase 1 clinical trial assessed immunogenicity 
of AVA alone and AVA plus CpG 7909 in 69 healthy adults 
aged 18–45 years (12). Vaccinations were administered IM on 
weeks 0, 2 (±1 day), and 4 (±2 days). The CpG group received 
AVA plus 1 mg of CpG 7909. The results showed that the 
peak GMT of TNA for the AV7909 group was 8.8-fold higher 
than that observed for the AVA-alone group; antibody peaked 
at week 6 in both arms. By week 3, GMT in the CpG group 
exceeded the peak GMT in the AVA group (reached at week 6). 
The TNA results paralleled those observed with anti-PA IgG, 
and in both assays the differences between AVA and AV7909 
were statistically significant. Analysis of the phase 2 TNA 
threshold of protection data for AV7909 revealed that addition 
of the CpG 7909 adjuvant to AVA improved the kinetics and 
magnitude of the immune response (56). A 2-dose AV7909 
regimen with 0.25 mg of CpG 7909 administered IM resulted 
in a similar serological response at week 9 compared with a 
3-dose AVA regimen administered IM and achieved a peak 
response by week 4 versus week 6 for AVA.
Safety
Adverse events were assessed in three clinical trials available 
at the time of this review, including a total of 241 subjects who 
were administered at least 1 dose of AVA plus CpG 7909 in 
varying dose combinations (10,12,45). The most common 
adverse events, reported in ≥20% of persons receiving AV7909 
across these clinical trials, were injection site reactions (e.g., 
mild to moderate pain, tenderness, and arm motion limitation); 
these typically resolved within 48 hours of administration. 
Systemic reactogenicity manifested primarily as mild to 
moderate fatigue, muscle ache, and headache. No deaths or 
serious adverse events assessed as being causally associated have 
been reported in AV7909 clinical studies.
In healthy adults aged 18–50 years who received 
CpG 7909-adjuvanted experimental vaccines for malaria and 
hepatitis B in the 0.25-mg dose that is combined with AVA 
in AV7909 (57,58), local and systemic reactions were similar 
to those observed in the groups who received malaria and 
hepatitis B vaccines without CpG 7909, and the proportion 
of subjects who dropped out because of adverse events 
did not differ between treatment and control groups (58). 
Reasons for discontinuation included rash, positive ANA, 
generalized pruritus, urticaria, and fever. These clinical trial 
reports suggested that these adverse events might be a result of 
activation of proinflammatory innate immune responses at the 
injection site. Theoretically, CpG 7909 could trigger the onset 
of autoimmune disease, possibly as a result of nonspecific T or B 
lymphocyte activation. Some studies reported mild to moderate 
increases in anti–double-stranded DNA antibody, rheumatoid 
factor, or positive ANA results. However, these increases in 
immune markers were typically transient. No adverse events 
suggesting autoimmune disease have been reported in the 
reviewed published data on CpG 7909-adjuvanted infectious 
disease vaccine trials (57–61). No safety data are available for 
CpG 7909-adjuvanted vaccines, including AV7909 among 
special populations (e.g., children, persons aged >65 years, 
and pregnant women).
Recommendations for Prevention of 
Anthrax Among Persons with 
Potential Risk for Exposure: PrEP
ACIP previously recommended AVA PrEP for prevention of 
anthrax in persons at high risk for exposure to B. anthracis (e.g., 
members of the U.S. military deployed to areas designated by 
DoD as high risk for exposure, laboratory workers who work 
with high concentrations of B. anthracis, and persons such 
as farmers, veterinarians, and livestock handlers who might 
handle infected animals or contaminated animal products) (9). 
In this report, ACIP recommends that a booster dose of AVA 
PrEP be given every 3 years to persons who are not at high risk 
for exposure to B. anthracis who have previously completed 
the 3-dose primary and the initial 2-dose boosters AVA series 
and want to maintain protection.
The PrEP schedule for persons at high risk for exposure 
to B. anthracis is AVA administered IM as a priming series at 
0, 1, and 6 months, with booster doses at 12 and 18 months and 
annually thereafter. If the vaccination schedule is interrupted, 
the series does not need to be restarted. After the priming series 
is completed, persons can work in high-risk areas of exposure 
with appropriate personal protective equipment and biosafety 
measures. Documentation of seroconversion is not required. If 
biosafety or respiratory protection measures are breached and 
exposure to aerosolized B. anthracis spores might have occurred, 
a 30-day course of PEP-Abx is recommended, regardless of 
whether PrEP has been fully or partially completed.
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Because of the lack of a quantifiable risk, emergency and 
other responders are not recommended to receive routine 
PrEP vaccination. However, emergency responders, because 
of the requirements of their occupation, might be exposed 
to aerosolized B. anthracis spores and thus may opt to receive 
the vaccine on a voluntary basis. For persons who are not 
currently at high risk for exposure to B. anthracis but who 
might be at high risk in the future (e.g., persons involved in 
emergency response activities), published data (35) support 
a booster dose interval of >1 year. Thus, a booster dose of 
AVA can be given every 3 years to persons not at high risk for 
exposure to B. anthracis who have previously received the initial 
AVA priming and booster series and who want to maintain 
protection. After completing the initial 3-dose priming 
and booster series, persons who have not received a booster 
dose in the last 12 months and need to enter an area where 
B. anthracis is suspected to be present in the environment or 
be in use should be given an IM booster dose and then either 
wait 2 weeks to enter the high-risk area or, if required to enter 
immediately, take PEP-Abx for 2 weeks. While in a high-risk 
area, a booster dose should be given within 1 year of the last 
booster dose.
Persons who are exposed to aerosolized B. anthracis spores 
but have not completed the initial priming and booster series 
for AVA should receive additional AVA doses and PEP-Abx. 
The number of vaccine doses and duration of PEP-Abx will 
vary in a manner commensurate with the number of previously 
received doses (Table 2).
Recommendations for Prevention of 
Anthrax Among Persons with 
Suspected or Known Exposure: PEP 
ACIP recommends AVA for use in adults aged 18–65 years 
to be given in conjunction with a course of antimicrobials 
(Table 3) to prevent infection after suspected or known 
exposure to aerosolized B. anthracis spores. Antimicrobial 
duration details are provided (Table 4). The vaccine is given 
at a dose of 0.5 mL SC at 0, 2, and 4 weeks postexposure, 
unless the emergency response requires a change to the IM 
route or use of dose-sparing regimens. If the PEP-Vx schedule 
is interrupted, the series does not need to be restarted. Instead, 
subsequent doses should be administered as soon as possible, 
and the series should be finished.
Route of Administration
ACIP recommends the SC route of administration 
rather than the IM route for PEP because higher antibody 
concentrations are achieved by 4 weeks after AVA vaccination. 
However, during a large-scale emergency response, AVA for 
PEP can be administered using an IM route if the SC route 
of administration poses significant materiel, personnel, or 
clinical challenges that might delay or preclude vaccination. In 
addition, persons who experienced adverse events from AVA 
that was administered SC may elect to receive subsequent 
vaccine doses IM after consultation with a health care provider. 
Doses of AVA inadvertently administered by the IM route 
rather than the SC route do not need to be repeated by the 
SC route.
Dose-Sparing PEP Regimens
ACIP recommends use of dose-sparing PEP regimens if the 
anthrax vaccine supply is insufficient to vaccinate all potentially 
exposed persons. The 2 full-dose strategy will expand the 
existing vaccine supply by 50%, and the 3 half-dose strategy 
will expand the supply by 100%. Immediately after a wide-area 
aerosolized release of B. anthracis spores, the preferred dose-
sparing PEP regimen might not be apparent until the size of 
the event is determined. All dose-sparing PEP-Vx regimens 
are estimated to provide high levels of protection 2 weeks after 
the last dose (Table 5). Existing data indicated that 2 doses 
administered 2 weeks apart or 4 weeks apart are effective; 
therefore, the 2-dose schedule should be ≥2 weeks apart and 
≤4 weeks apart, recognizing that full protection is not achieved 
until 2 weeks after the second dose (37).
Antimicrobial Duration in Conjunction 
with FDA-Licensed or Dose-Sparing PEP 
Regimens of AVA
ACIP recommends that in immunocompetent adults (e.g., 
healthy, nonpregnant adults aged 18–65 years), PEP-Abx 
both for the licensed and dose-sparing PEP-Vx regimens can 
be discontinued 42 days after initiation of vaccine if AVA is 
administered on schedule for both the licensed and dose-
sparing PEP-Vx regimens (Table 4). If the AVA series cannot 
be completed, then antimicrobial therapy should continue 
for 60 days. However, the second dose of AVA is critical for 
producing high antibody concentrations. To account for 
delays in initial vaccination that might occur because of the 
emergency situation, antimicrobial administration should be 
initiated as soon as possible and continued for 42 days after 
the first dose or 2 weeks after the last dose of the vaccine series, 
whichever comes last. No data on humans are available to 
suggest that PEP-Abx should be given for >60 days, which is 
the recommended duration for PEP-Abx when given without 
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TABLE 2. Transition from preexposure prophylaxis* schedule to postexposure prophylaxis schedule for persons who have not completed a 
priming and initial booster series† and must immediately enter an area that poses a high risk§ for Bacillus anthracis exposure
Previous 
PrEP doses Interval since last dose
PEP
PEP-Vx PEP-Abx¶
0 — Dose 1 (week 0) Administer until 42 days after first dose of AVA or 14 days after last dose, whichever 
occurs later.Dose 2 (week 2)
Dose 3 (week 4)
1 — Dose 2 (week 0) Administer until 28 days after second dose of AVA or 14 days after the last dose, 
whichever occurs later.Dose 3 (week 2)
2 — Dose 3 (week 0) Administer until 14 days after last dose.
3, 4 >6 mos Booster dose Administer until 14 days after booster dose.
3, 4 ≤6 mos No booster No antimicrobials needed
Abbreviations: AVA = anthrax vaccine adsorbed; PEP = postexposure prophylaxis; PEP-Abx = antimicrobial PEP; PEP-Vx = AVA PEP; PrEP = preexposure prophylaxis. 
* No data are available on the effect on the immune response for starting PrEP by the intramuscular route and switching to the subcutaneous route to join the PEP 
schedule; however, no evidence suggests that the immune response would be adversely affected by mixing the routes of administration.
† Priming doses at 0, 1, and 6 mos, with booster doses at 12 and 18 mos. 
§ The licensed booster schedule for high-risk exposure applies while in the high-risk area.
¶ If the AVA series cannot be completed, then antimicrobial therapy should continue for 60 days.
TABLE 3. Oral antimicrobial dosages for use in adults in conjunction 
with anthrax vaccine adsorbed for postexposure prophylaxis
Strain Drug and dosage*
For all strains, regardless of 
penicillin susceptibility or if 
susceptibility is unknown
Ciprofloxacin,† 500 mg every 12 hrs
Doxycycline,† 100 mg every 12 hrs
Levofloxacin, 750 mg every 24 hrs
Moxifloxacin,§ 400 mg every 24 hrs
Clindamycin,§ 600 mg every 8 hrs
Alternatives for penicillin-
susceptible strains
Amoxicillin,§ 1,000 mg every 8 hrs
Penicillin VK,§ 500 mg every 6 hrs
Abbreviations: FDA = Food and Drug Administration; PEP-Abx = antimicrobial 
postexposure prophylaxis.
* Any one of these drug regimens.
† First-line drugs; alternative drugs are listed in order of preference for PEP-Abx 
for patients who cannot take first-line treatment or if first-line PEP-Abx is 
unavailable.
§ Not FDA approved for PEP-Abx of inhalation anthrax.
TABLE 4. Antimicrobial duration when used in conjunction with Food 
and Drug Administration–licensed or dose-sparing postexposure 
prophylaxis regimens of anthrax vaccine adsorbed*
Population with suspected or 
known exposure
Duration of antimicrobial 
regimen
Immunocompetent adults aged 18–65 yrs 42 days when initiated 
concurrently with first dose of 
AVA or for 14 days after last 
AVA dose, whichever is later 
(not to exceed 60 days)
Adults aged 18–65 yrs with 
immunocompromising conditions 
(e.g., cancer or HIV infection) or receiving 
immunosuppressive therapy (e.g., 
high-dose corticosteroids for >2 wks 
or radiation therapy)†
60 days
All older adults (>65 yrs) 60 days
All pregnant women and nursing mothers 60 days
All children (≤17 yrs) 60 days
Abbreviation: AVA = anthrax vaccine adsorbed.
* If the AVA series cannot be completed, then antimicrobial therapy should 
continue for 60 days.
† Source: Löbermann M, Boršo D, Hilgendorf I, Fritzsche C, Zettl UK, Reisinger 
EC. Immunization in the adult immunocompromised host. Autoimmun Rev 
2012;11:212–8.
TABLE 5. Postexposure prophylaxis with anthrax vaccine adsorbed 
dose-sparing regimens
Dose Route of administration Dosing schedule
0.5 mL (full dose) SC or IM* 2 doses: 0 and 2–4 wks
0.25 mL (half dose) SC or IM* 3 doses: 0, 2, and 4 wks
Abbreviations: IM = intramuscular; SC = subcutaneous.
* Can be administered IM if the SC route of administration poses significant materiel, 
personnel, or clinical challenges that might delay or preclude vaccination.
vaccine. Thus, PEP-Abx should not be given for >60 days, 
regardless of the timing of last vaccine dose. 
The shortening of PEP-Abx duration from 60 days to 42 days, 
or 2 weeks after the last dose of vaccine, applies to healthy 
adults aged 18–65 years. Persons with immunocompromising 
conditions that might interfere with their ability to develop an 
adequate immune response or populations for whom data on 
immune response to AVA are lacking (e.g., children, pregnant 
women, and adults aged ≥65 years) should continue to receive 
PEP-Abx for 60 days concurrently with AVA.
Potential Emergency Use of AV7909
Because of supply concerns and the investigational status 
of AV7909, AVA should be prioritized over AV7909 for 
PEP-Vx of potential exposure to aerosolized B. anthracis 
spores. However, the limited amount of phase 2 safety and 
immunogenicity data indicate that AV7909 appears to be 
safe and effective. The benefits of an effective vaccine that 
can prevent anthrax outweigh the known potential risks for 
adverse events in persons potentially exposed to aerosolized 
B. anthracis spores. Therefore, if supplies of AVA are exhausted 
or unavailable, AV7909 is an option for PEP of persons exposed 
to aerosolized B. anthracis spores under an EUA granted by 
FDA. As with AVA, antimicrobials (Tables 3 and 4) should 
be taken in conjunction with AV7909. Additional AV7909 
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data on safety, immunogenicity, and biocompatibility with 
antimicrobials will be reviewed by ACIP as they become 
available, and recommendations on potential preferential use 
will be updated as needed.
No data are available on the immunogenicity or safety of 
AV7909 for children or other special populations. However, 
a phase 2 clinical trial is being conducted to assess the safety 
and immunogenicity of AVA and AV7909 in adults aged 
>65 years compared with adults aged 18–50 years (62). In 
the absence of such data, AVWG considered it reasonable to 
anticipate that risks and benefits of PEP-Vx for children or 
special populations would be similar to those for the general 
adult population. Therefore, if AVA is not available, emergency 
use of AV7909 under an appropriate regulatory mechanism 
should be considered for all populations with known or 
potential exposure to aerosolized B. anthracis spores. Should 
an anthrax exposure event occur that necessitates AV7909 use 
while it remains under development and is not yet licensed, 
ACIP will convene an emergency meeting to review available 
data for specific recommendations on AV7909 emergency use.
No studies have been conducted on the interchangeability 
of AVA and AV7909. When feasible, doses of the same vaccine 
type should be used to complete a series. However, vaccination 
should not be deferred because the previously used vaccine 
type is unavailable. When a vaccine series uses a combination 
of AVA and AV7909, 3 total doses of anthrax vaccine should 
be administered and used in conjunction with appropriate 
antimicrobials (Tables 3 and 5).
Antitoxin Use for PEP
Three licensed anthrax antitoxins are available from the 
Strategic National Stockpile: anthrax immune globulin 
intravenous (AIGIV) (63), obiltoxaximab (Anthim) (64), and 
raxibacumab (ABthrax) (65). AIGIV is a polyclonal antibody, 
whereas obiltoxaximab and raxibacumab are both monoclonal 
antibodies. All work by binding to protective antigen, which 
blocks movement of toxins into cells and therefore the effects 
of toxins within the cells. All three antitoxins are indicated 
in all adults and children for the treatment of inhalation 
anthrax due to B. anthracis, in combination with appropriate 
antimicrobial drugs. 
Obiltoxaximab and raxibacumab also have an indication 
for PEP of inhalation anthrax due to B. anthracis when 
alternative therapies are not available or are not appropriate. 
In these situations, obiltoxaximab or raxibacumab may be 
considered to help prevent inhalation anthrax. The predicted 
effectiveness of both antitoxins for this indication is based 
solely on efficacy studies conducted in animal models of 
inhalation anthrax (66,67).
Data indicate that raxibacumab can be coadministered 
with AVA for PEP without affecting vaccine immunogenicity 
(68). No data are available to assess whether obiltoxaximab 
coadministered with AVA impairs vaccine immunogenicity. 
AIGIV does not have a PEP indication because coadministration 
of AIGIV and AVA in a rabbit model has been shown to 
significantly reduce the development of an immune response 
to AVA (68).
Vaccine Adverse Events Reporting 
and Additional Information
Surveillance for serious adverse events is important for 
all antimicrobials, biologics, and vaccines. All clinically 
significant adverse events after receipt of antimicrobials or 
anthrax antitoxin for PEP or treatment of anthrax should be 
reported to the MedWatch Program (https://www.fda.gov/
safety/medwatch-fda-safety-information-and-adverse-event-
reporting-program or 888-463-6332). All clinically significant 
adverse events after receipt of either AVA or AV7909 should be 
reported to VAERS (https://vaers.hhs.gov or 800–822–7967). 
Additional information about anthrax and anthrax vaccines is 
available at https://www.cdc.gov/anthrax.
Future Directions
Research priorities for future studies on anthrax vaccines 
should include assessment of immunogenicity and safety in 
special populations, such as children, older adults, and pregnant 
and nursing mothers; additional evaluations of the dose-sparing 
schedules; evaluation of the interchangeability of AVA and 
AV7909; determination of the optimal booster schedule to 
provide long-term protection after receiving the PEP vaccine 
schedule; testing of the stability of AVA and AV7909 outside 
the cold chain; assessment of whether coadministration of 
obiltoxaximab with AVA impairs vaccine immunogenicity; 
and the optimal duration of antimicrobial use in postexposure 
settings. Studies are planned to evaluate the effect of longer 
intervals between PrEP boosters on vaccine responses. On 
approval of AV7909 as a licensed vaccine, the additional data 
leading to the licensure of AV7909 will be reviewed by ACIP, 
and recommendations will be updated as needed.
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